A CHANGE OF ERA IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE GOVERNANCE

Considerations on some potential effects of Article 30.4 of the TPP

English and spanish versión.

Felix Peña

Abstract:

An epochal change in world order is leading to the redesign of the governance of the international trading system. Understood as the set of institutions and ground rules that provide certain order to the exchange of goods and services in the world and its regions, the governance that has prevailed in recent decades originates mostly from the results of the negotiations which led first to the creation of the GATT and then the WTO. Nowadays, the difficulties for the redesign of said governance can be found in at least three closely interlinked fronts.

The first of these is the global multilateral front, previously institutionalized in the GATT and now in the WTO. After the Ministerial Conferences of Bali (2013) and Nairobi (2015) very few observers dare express optimism about the future of the Doha Round. This is so partly because real objective difficulties to advance and conclude a complex multilateral negotiation, even if only as a consequence of the number and diversity of the participating countries, can be perceived. Also, no true interest in achieving significant advances in global multilateral negotiations can be perceived, especially on the side of those countries whose energy is more focused on promoting the so-called mega-interregional agreements such as the TPP and TTIP.

The second front is that of the eventual convergence of the multiple regional and interregional scenarios where preferential trade agreements have been developing and which, regardless of their names and format, are like “private clubs” of world trade. That means that they discriminate against goods, services, individuals and capitals hailing from non-member countries, especially when they attempt to enter the markets of the member countries of a particular club or to operate within them.

And the third front is the “mood” of the citizens of many countries regarding the way the rules of international trade are negotiated, whether globally, regionally or inter-regionally, i.e.: what is considered a lack of transparency in the information that is needed in order to follow and understand the respective negotiations.

The negotiations for the TPP were not transparent, if we take this term to mean that the relevant information on the texts and concessions is disclosed beyond the most restricted circle of those directly involved in the process, either on the side of governments or of the so-called “rooms next door”. Now that the full texts have become available some articles call our attention due to the potential effects of erosion that they would have in the global multilateral trading system.

There is a growing consensus in the sense that the world has been undergoing a change of era the last several years. A model of international order –whatever its defects and limitations– originated in the events that occurred between 1914 and 1945 is coming to an end. Institutions and paradigms that were characteristic of this model are now in crisis. Uncertainty prevails about the future of the international order, which usually translates into the bewilderment and anguish of citizenships. In turn, this can lead to systemic crises at the internal level of nations.

History teaches that during epochal changes of the international world order frequently force prevails over reason. Emotions and passions are unleashed. The approaches of Dominique Moisi (“The Geopolitics of Emotions” Grupo Editorial Norma, Bogotá 2009) and Bertrand Badie (“Le Temps des Humiliés. Pathologie des Relations Internationales”, Odile Jacob, Paris 2014) acquire thus enormous relevance.

The idea of changing times seems implicit in a recent and suggestive article that Larry Summers–Treasury Secretary during the Clinton administration and currently professor at Harvard University–published in the Financial Times on April 10, 2016, entitled “Global trade should be remade from the bottom up“. It begins by noting that, since the Second World War, a pillar of the international order has been the existence of a broad consensus in support of global economic integration as a factor for peace and prosperity. But, according to him, today it is clear that such consensus has been eroded. In the countries that promoted it, meaning the Western world, a turn against the idea of global economic integration is becoming evident.

This is a backlash that can make it very difficult to obtain the necessary parliamentary approval for all the agreements that are negotiated and signed. In our opinion, such could be the case, for example, of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). After being signed last February, doubts have kept mounting as to whether the agreement will indeed be ratified by the minimum number of countries required by Article 30-5. (For the full text of the TPP go to https://www.direcon.gob.cl/tpp/capitulos-del-acuerdo/).The United States is one of the countries in which such doubts are beginning to become manifest. They can even be seen reflected in the statements of candidates running for Presidency on the November elections.

According to Summers, resistance and doubt can be attributed to a lack of knowledge. In such case, he understands that there would be an opportunity to explain to the citizens the positive effects of the globalization of world trade. However, he believes that at the core of this reaction is the idea that globalization is a project of elites, represented by large companies, for the benefit of a select group and thus with little regard for the interests of ordinary people. Hence the importance of having strong global institutions in order to prevent the occurrence of something similar to what happened in the twenties, which led to the disasters of the following years.

Summers’ concrete proposal is that global economic integration should be addressed more with projects that arise from the bottom up than from the top down. This would involve deriving the priority of the negotiation of international trade agreements, toward harmonization agreements at the level of relevant issues such as labor rights and environmental protection. That is, it would mean placing more emphasis on negotiating measures related to the effects of trade integration in the social sphere and in the economic development of countries.

In any case, it is evident that this change of era is leading to the redesign of the governance of the international trading system. Understood as the set of institutions and rules that provide certain order in the exchange of goods and services in the world and its regions, the modality that has prevailed in recent decades arose mainly from the negotiations that led first to the creation of the GATT and then of the WTO.

The difficulties for the redesign of this governance can now be evinced in at least three closely interlinked fronts.

The first of these is the global multilateral front, formerly institutionalized in the GATT and currently in the WTO. After the Ministerial Conferences of Bali (2013) and Nairobi (2015), very few observers dare to express optimism about the future of the Doha Round. This is so partly because real objective difficulties to advance and conclude a complex multilateral negotiation, even if only because of the number and diversity of the participating countries, can be perceived. But also because no true interest in achieving significant advances in global multilateral negotiations can be perceived, especially on the side of those countries whose energy is more focused on promoting the so-called mega-interregional agreements, such as the TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

The second front is that of the eventual convergence of the multiple regional and interregional scenarios where preferential trade agreements have been developing and which, regardless of their names and format, are like “private clubs” of world trade. That means that, in one way or another, they discriminate against goods, services, individuals and capitals hailing from non-member countries, especially when these are attempting to enter the markets of the member countries of a particular “club” or to operate within them.

And the third front is the “mood” of the citizens of many countries regarding the way the rules of international trade are negotiated, whether globally, regionally or inter-regionally, i.e.: what is considered a lack of transparency in the information that is needed in order to follow and understand the corresponding negotiations.

This is one of the most frequent complaints regarding the negotiation of the TPP, but also of other inter-regional negotiations such as those of the EU with Mercosur and with India.

It has been held, especially by institutions representing social sectors, that the negotiations for the TPP were not transparent, if by this term we understand that the relevant information on texts and concessions is provided willingly beyond the restricted circle of those directly involved, either on the side of governments and their negotiators, or the so-called “rooms next door”.

Now that the full texts have been disclosed, some articles call our attention due to their potential erosion effects on the multilateral global trading system. This is particularly the case of Article 30-4 which establishes who can adhere to the TPP. Its first paragraph reads as follows: “This Agreement is open to accession by: (a) any State or separate customs territory that is a member of APEC; and (b) any other State or separate customs territory as the Parties may agree, that is prepared to comply with the obligations in this Agreement, subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the State or separate customs territory and the Parties, and following approval in accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each Party and acceding State or separate customs territory (accession candidate)” (https://www.direcon.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/30.-Final-Provisions.pdf). Further on, in paragraph b, it opens the possibility for other countries that are not members of the APEC and with no physical connection to the Pacific Ocean, to apply to join the TPP. Would it be possible for those countries of the Atlantic coast of South America, Africa or other geographical regions distant from the Pacific to adhere to the Treaty?

If that were the intention of Article 30-4, one might then wonder about the real scope of the TPP and its impact on the effectiveness of the multilateral trading system. The idea that it could have a long term disruptive impact on the current WTO and the effects sought in the GATT through the interplay of Articles I and XXIV, would then have a greater incidence on the debate on the governance of the international trading system and on the consequences of the different forms of erosion of its institutions and rules.

Recommended Reading:

• APEC, “Workshop Report: Facilitating Trade through Updates on Food Safety Regulatory Standards of APEC Economies”, APEC-Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance, Singapore, February 2016, http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1713.
• Bartesaghi, Ignacio, “Las relaciones entre Japón y América Latina”, Observatorio América Latina – Asia Pacífico, 2016, http://www.observatorioasiapacifico.com/OBSExternalUI/pages/public/publicationForm.jsf?ni=2142&ci=1.
• Brown, Chad, “The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection form Imports”, For inclusion in the “Critical Perspectives on the Global Trading System and the WTO” series Edited by Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman Edward Elgar Publishing, 27 May 2005, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.546.9796&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
• CIGI, “The Road To a Reinvigorated North American Partnership. Special Report”, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, 2016, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/can-mex_report_2016_web.pdf.
• Estevadeordal, Antoni, “What TPP means for Latin America and the Caribbean”, Brookings, Opinion, March 9, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/03/09-tpp-latin-america-caribbean-estevadeordal.
• FAO-ALADI, “Seguridad Alimentaria y Comercio Intrarregional de Alimentos en la ALADI”, Documento conjunto FAO-ALADI, Montevideo, October 2012, http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/estudios.nsf/AC7B9862547B5BF903257AC300511822/$FILE/PUBLICACI%D3N%20SEGURIDAD%20ALIMENTARIA.pdf.
• FAO-ALADI, “Desarrollo del Comercio Intrarregional de Alimentos y Fortalecimiento de la Seguridad Alimentaria en América Latina y el Caribe”, Documento conjunto FAO-ALADI, Santiago de Chile 2015, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4454s.pdf y http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4511s.pdf.
• Giddens, Anthony, “Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics”, Polity Press, Cambridge – Malden, 1994.
• Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obama Doctrine. The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world”, The Atlantic, April 2016 Issue, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.
• Grossman, Gene N., “The Purpose of Trade Agreements”, NBER Working Papers Series, Working Paper 22070, Cambridge M.A. March 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22070.
• Guillain, Robert, “Dans 30 ans la Chine”, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1965.
• Kaldor, Mary, “New & Old Wars. Organized violence in a global era”, Polity Press, Cambridge- Malden, 2012.
• LeoGrande, William M.; Kornbluh, “Black Channel to Cuba. The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana”, The University of North Carolina Press – Chapel Hill, 2015.
• Meneses, Juan Pablo, “Una vuelta al tercer mundo”, Debate, Buenos Aires 2016.
• Merke, Federico, “Época de cambios o cambio de época”, Diario “La Nación”, 13 March 2016, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1878593-epoca-de-cambios-o-cambio-de-epoca.
• Mouffe, Chantal, “Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically”, Verso, London – New York, 2013.
• Observatorio América Latina – Asia Pacífico, “Explorando espacios para la integración productiva entre América Latina y Asia Pacífico”, publicación del Observatorio América Latina – Asia Pacífico, compilada y editada por Ignacio Bartesaghi, Montevideo, March 2016, http://www.observatorioasiapacifico.com/data/OBSERVATORIO.Images/Publication/temp/20160330123304ExplorandoespaciosparalaintegracinproductivaentreAmricaLatinayAsiaPacfico.pdf.
• Tabakis, Chrysostomos, “Managing Trade during the Formation of Customs Unions”, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, February 15, 2007, http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/EEA-ESEM/2007/2182/CUs%20and%20Managed%20Trade.pdf.
• The Brookings Institution, “Reporters Roundtable. Foreign Policy” Washington D.C. Tuesday, March 15, 2016, en: The Brookings Institution, “Reporters Roundtable Foreign Policy” Washington D.C. Tuesday, March 15, 2016.

_______________________________________________________________________

(*) Director of the Institute for International Trade of the ICBC Foundation; Director of the Master Degree in International Trade Relations at Tres de Febrero National University (UNTREF). Member of the Executive Committee of the Argentine Council for International Relations, (CARI). Member of the Evian Group Brains Trust.

ESPAÑOL;

CAMBIOS DE ÉPOCA EN LA GOBERNANZA COMERCIAL INTERNACIONAL
Consideraciones sobre algunos efectos potenciales del artículo 30-4 del TPP

La historia enseña que en los cambios de época en el orden internacional se recurre más a la fuerza que a la razón. Se activan emociones y pasiones. Los planteamientos de Dominique Moïsi (“La Geopolítica de las Emociones”, Grupo Editorial Norma, Bogotá 2009) y de Bertrand Badie (“Le Temps des Humiliés. Pathologie des Relations Internationales”, Odile Jacob, Paris 2014), adquieren entonces enorme actualidad.

La idea de cambio de época parece implícita en un reciente y sugerente artículo que Larry Summers -que fuera Secretario de Tesoro en el gobierno del Presidente Clinton y es hoy profesor de Harvard- publicara en el Financial Times del 10 abril 2016, con el título “Global trade should be remade from the bottom up”. Comienza constatando que, desde la segunda guerra mundial, un pilar del orden internacional ha sido la existencia de un amplio consenso en el apoyo a la integración económica global como factor de paz y prosperidad. Pero, según él, hoy se observa que tal consenso se ha erosionado. En los países que lo impulsaron, esto es los del mundo occidental, se está tornando evidente una revuelta contra la idea de integración económica global.

Es ésta una revuelta que puede hacer muy difícil el lograr que los acuerdos que se negocien y se firmen, puedan obtener en todos los casos la necesaria aprobación parlamentaria. En nuestra opinión tal podría ser el caso, por ejemplo, del Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Tras haber sido firmado en el mes de febrero último, comienzan a observarse dudas sobre la posibilidad que efectivamente el acuerdo sea ratificado por el número mínimo de países que requiere su artículo 30-5. (para el texto completo del TPP, puede consultarse https://www.direcon.gob.cl/). Estados Unidos es uno de los países en el cual tales dudas se están manifestando, reflejándose en pronunciamientos de candidatos a las elecciones presidenciales del mes de noviembre.

Resistencias y dudas pueden ser atribuidas, en la visión de Summers, a falta de conocimiento. En tal caso, entiende, que habría espacio para explicar a los ciudadanos los efectos positivos de la globalización del comercio mundial. Sin embargo, él considera que el núcleo duro de tal revuelta es la idea que se tiene, en el sentido de que la globalización es un proyecto de elites representadas por grandes empresas en beneficio de las elites y, por ende, con poca consideración a los intereses de la gente común. De allí la importancia de instituciones globales fuertes, a fin de evitar lo que ya ocurriera en el período de la década del veinte en el siglo pasado, y que condujo a los desastres de los años siguientes.

La propuesta concreta de Summers es que la integración económica global debiera encararse más con proyectos de abajo hacia arriba (bottom-up), que de arriba hacia abajo (top-down). Ello implicaría derivar la prioridad de la negociación de acuerdos comerciales internacionales a la de acuerdos de armonización en el plano de cuestiones relevantes, tales como las de los derechos laborales y protección ambiental. Es decir, significaría poner más el acento en negociar medidas relacionadas con los efectos de la integración comercial, en el plano social y en el del desarrollo económico de los países.

En todo caso, puede constatarse que el mencionado cambio de época se está traduciendo en el rediseño de la gobernanza del sistema comercial internacional. Entendida como el conjunto de instituciones y reglas de juego que permiten un cierto orden en los intercambios de bienes y servicios en el mundo y en las regiones, la modalidad que ha predominado en las últimas décadas proviene, en especial, de las negociaciones que condujeron, primero a la creación del GATT y luego a la de la OMC.

Al menos en tres frentes se observan ahora dificultades para el rediseño de tal gobernanza. Son tres frentes muy vinculados entre sí.

El primero es el global multilateral institucionalizado precisamente antes en el GATT y ahora en la OMC. Tras las Conferencias Ministeriales de Bali (2013) y de Nairobi (2015), muy pocos observadores se atreven a manifestar optimismo con respecto al futuro de la Rueda Doha. Ello es así, en parte porque se perciben dificultades objetivas reales para avanzar y concluir una negociación multilateral que es compleja, aunque más no sea por el número y diversidad de países participantes. Pero también porque no se alcanza a percibir un interés real en lograr avances significativos, en especial por parte de los países que más energía concentran en impulsar los denominados mega-acuerdos interregionales, tales como el TPP y el Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

El segundo frente es el de la eventual convergencia de los múltiples escenarios regionales e interregionales en los que se han ido desarrollando acuerdos comerciales preferenciales, que cualesquiera que sean sus denominaciones y formatos, representan una especie de “clubes privados” del comercio mundial. Es decir, que de una manera u otra discriminan -especialmente a la hora de intentar el ingreso a los mercados de los países miembros del respectivo club, o de operar dentro de los mismos- con respecto a bienes, servicios, personas y capitales provenientes de terceros países no miembros.

Y el tercero es el del “humor” de los ciudadanos de muchos países, con respecto a la forma en que se negocian reglas del comercio internacional -sea el global o el regional/inter-regional-, esto es, a lo que se considera como falta de suficiente transparencia de la información necesaria para seguir y entender las respectivas negociaciones.

Es esa una de las quejas más frecuentes que se escuchan con respecto a la negociación del TPP, pero también de otras negociaciones inter-regionales, tales como las de la UE con el Mercosur y con la India.

Se sostiene, especialmente por instituciones que representan a los sectores sociales, que la negociación del TPP no ha sido transparente, si por ello se entiende que la información relevante sobre textos y concesiones hubiera trascendido con fluidez, al ámbito más restringido de quienes intervenían en ella, sea por el lado de los gobiernos y de sus negociadores, o de los denominados “cuartos de al lado”.

Ahora que se conocen los textos completos, algunos artículos llaman la atención por implicar potenciales efectos de erosión del sistema global multilateral de comercio. Es concretamente el caso del artículo 30-4. Establece quienes pueden adherir al TPP. En su primer párrafo dice lo siguiente: “Este Tratado está abierto a la adhesión por: (a) cualquier Estado o territorio aduanero distinto que sea miembro de APEC; y (b) cualquier otro Estado o territorio aduanero distinto que las Partes puedan acordar, que esté preparado para cumplir con las obligaciones de este Tratado, sujeto a los términos y condiciones que puedan ser acordados entre el Estado o el territorio aduanero distinto y las Partes, y previa aprobación de conformidad con los procedimientos legales aplicables de cada Parte y el Estado o territorio aduanero distinto adherente (candidato a la adhesión). En el literal b, se abre entonces la posibilidad que cualquier país pueda solicitar adherirse al TPP aunque no sea miembro de APEC, ni tenga ninguna conexión física con el Océano Pacífico. ¿Podrían adherirse, por ejemplo, países de la costa Atlántica de América del Sur, de África u otras regiones geográficas lejanas del Pacífico?

Si esa fuera la intención del artículo 30-4, cabría entonces interrogarse sobre los reales alcances del TPP y sobre sus efectos en la eficacia del sistema comercial multilateral. La idea de que pudiera tener un efecto disruptivo sobre la actual OMC y sobre los efectos procurados en el GATT por el juego combinado de sus artículos I y XXIV, pasaría a tener una mayor incidencia en el debate sobre la gobernanza del sistema comercial internacional y sobre las consecuencias de distintas modalidades de erosión de sus instituciones y reglas.